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BY WILLIAM W. SCHWARZER
Some condemn Rule 11 as the death knell of the
adversary system, shackling innovative and vig-
orous advocacy. Others praise it as the salvation
of the civil-justice process, bringing litigation abuse
to an end. I believe that the truth lies somewhere
in between. Rule 11 is a good rule, meeting a defi-
nite need, but unless properly used by lawyers and
judges, it is susceptible to abuse.
On September 21, 1983, Robin Albright filed suit
in federal district court against nine drug manu-
facturers charging that the tetracycline which they
manufactured had caused her teeth to become per-
manently stained. One of the manufacturers was
Upjohn Company. Her complaint alleged that when
she was a child, physicians had prescribed various
tetracycline drugs, some of which she named. Up-
john, whose drugs were not identified in the com-
plaint, made a motion for summary judgment to
which the plaintiff never responded. However, she
did file an amended complaint dropping Upjohn.
After its motion was granted, Upjohn moved for
sanctions tinder Rule 11.
The trial court denied the request, but on appeal
the Sixth Circuit reversed and held that it was an
abuse of the court's discretion not to award sanc-
tions. The court of appeals accepted Upjohn's ar-
gument that plaintiff had had ample time to conduct
a reasonable investigation before filing the com-
plaint, and, had she done so, she would have learned
before bringing suit against Upjohn that there was
no evidence that she had ever taken one of its prod-
ucts.
The Albright case dramatically illustrates the
purpose of Rule 11-to impose on lawyers a duty
to conduct a reasonable investigation before filing
a paper in court, whether it is a complaint, an an-
swer, or a motion. As Professor Arthur Miller of
Harvard Law has put it, the rule is intended to make
lawyers stop and think before filing.
The Advisory Committee on the Civil Rules fur-
ther explains its purpose in these words:
Greater attention by the district courts to
pleading and motion abuses and the imposition
of sanctions, when appropriate, should dis-
courage dilatory or abusive tactics and help to
streamline the litigation process by lessening
frivolous claims or defenses.
It is difficult to argue with this purpose. There has
been abundant evidence of dilatory and abusive
tactics, resulting in costs and delays sometimes
frustrating justice altogether. Even the most vig-
oi ,us opponents of Rule 11 will, I expect, concede
that at some point the imposition of sanctions be-
comes appropriate. (See PRO, page 28)
William W. Schwarzer is a U.S. district judge in
San Fratcisca.
BY JEROLD S. SOLOVY
I always hesitate to disagree with Judge Schwarzer
on anything. However, I do disagree with his con-
clusion that Rule 11 is having a salutary effect on
the litigation process. In fact, the contrary is true.
One only has to look at the Advisory Committee
Comments to Rule 11 to see that it has not fulfilled
the expectations of the drafters. For example, the
Comments state that Rule 11 is designed to
"streamline the litigation process" and that it is
not intended to spawn "satellite litigation."
There are now more than 1,000 reported Rule 11
decisions and undoubtedly hundreds, if not thou-
sands, of unreported Rule 11 opinions. Thus, the
litigation process has not been streamlined and sat-
ellite litigation has become a fact of life tinder Rule
11. Indeed, Rule 11 is quickly outpacing RICO as
the cottage industry of the 1980s. Undoubtedly in
this new decade, every case will involve some form
of Rule 11 motion and resulting decision.
The Advisory Committee Comments also state
that the rule is not intended to "chill an attorney's
enthusiasm or creativity in pursuing factual or le-
gal theories." We have seen courts impose sanc-
tions in amounts totaling tens of thousands and
hundreds of thousands of dollars. I submit that
sanctions of this magnitude chill, and probably kill,
a lawyer's ardor and enthusiasm for forging new
legal frontiers.
"Wisdom of Hindsight"
The Comments also state that the court should
not use the "wisdom of hindsight." However, it is
apparent that many Rule 11 decisions are in fact
based on hindsight rather than an effort to deter-
mine what the lawyer should have done when the
pleading or paper was filed. Some courts have an
unfortunate tendency, having reached a decision,
to conclude that anyone who advocated a contrary
position failed to perform a reasonable inquiry.
What the court may conciude in hindsight was
the critical issue, however, may hsxvc been one of
a myriad of factual and legal issues facing a lawyer
at the time he or she filed a complaint or other
pleading. And the critical fact or legal analysis that
now seems obvious to the court was not clear at
the time of filing. In this respect, courts often ig-
nore the limited facts typically available to plain-
tiffs before filing a complaint and, Judge
Schwarzer's comments notwithstanding, the un-
willingness of defendants to cooperate in provid-
ing information to potential plaintiffs.
Another classic example of hindsight in Rule 11
occurs when sanctions are imposed after a full trial
(See CON, page 29)




(Continued from page 27)
The difficulty, of course, lies in
defining that point clearly so that
lawyers will know what is ex-
pected of them. Opponents argue
that often the subjective judg-
ment of the particular judge will
determine whether sanctions are
imposed. But that is as true of
Rule 11 as it is of so many deci-
sions judges are called on to
make-judicial discretion is in-
herent in the system, and law-
yers are accustomed to dealing
with it.
Albright illustrates a pretty
clear violation of Rule 11. A law-
yer should understand his or her
obligation to investigate whether
there are facts to support a claim
against a defendant before nam-
ing that defendant in the com-
plaint. That does not mean, of
course, that the lawyer must
have a summary judgment-proof
case-only that the claim, de-
fense, or other paper, is "well
grounded in fact."
Sometimes the facts are not as
readily accessible as they were to
Albright, who only had to check
with her physicians and hospi-
tals to find out which drugs had
been prescribed. In other cases,
the facts may be largely under
control of the prospective defen-
dant. But that is no reason for the
plaintiff's lawyer not to conduct
a reasonable investigation before
filing.
Get the Client's Story
Obviously, the lawyer should
begin by getting the client's story.
But a reasonable investigation
does not stop there. The lawyer
should then look for corrobora-
tion of that story. He or she
would examine records and doc-
uments, interview witnesses,
consult public records, and per-
haps even request critical infor-
mation from the prospective
defendant itself.
Is it absurd to suggest, for ex-
ample, that a person who feels
discriminated against by the em-
ployer should, before filing, ask
the employer for relevant data
bearing on the treatment of per-
sons of a different gender or race?
Not at all.
The corollary of protecting
prospective defendants against
frivolous claims is to require
them to respond reasonably and
fairly to requests intended to de-
termine whether a claim would be
frivolous.
The same duty to investigate
rests on defendants. The day of
boilerplate defense is over. There
is no more reason why a plaintiff
should be burdened with having
to litigate baseless defenses than
for a defendant to defend against
frivolous claims.
Some argue that the effect of
all this is to make unnecessary
work for lawyers, and more ex-
pense for clients. If requiring
lawyers to do a reasonable
amount of preparation before fil-
ing will result in added cost, then
that is a necessary cost that is
well justified. For the alternative
is to permit dilatory and abusive
practices making litigation more
burdensome and much more
costly in the end.
Rule 11 also requires the law-
yer to satisfy himself or herself
that the paper being filed is
"warranted by existing law or a
good-faith argument for the ex-
tension, modification, or rever-
sal of existing law." This has
been the most controversial part
of the rule. The Advisory Com-
mittee stated that the rule is not
intended to "chill an attorney's
enthusiasm or creativity in pur-
suing factual or legal theories."
But judges do not necessarily
agree on where to draw the line
on legitimate advocacy.
Is the Argument Reasonable?
This is not a ground for con-
demning the rule. Implicit in it is
an intent to deter lawyers from
getting as close to the line as they
can-from pushing the rule to see
what they can get away with. In
preparing an argument, a lawyer
should ask not whether it will
lead to sanctions, but whether it
is an argument that can reason-
ably be made in light of how the
law is developing and that has a
chance of being persuasive.
Arguments may not succeed
the first time-sometimes it
takes persistence to prevail. The
rule does not punish persistence,
but it does warn lawyers against
filing a paper for "any improper
purpose, such as to harass or to
cause unnecessary delay or need-
less increase in the cost of liti-
gation." Once something has been
finally and authoritatively de-
cided, or the court has made it
clear that it will stand on its rul-
ing, pursuing the matter may be




and other paper of a party
represented by an attorney
shall be signed by at least
one attorney of record
.... The signature of any
attorney ... constitutes a
certificate by the signer
that the signer has read the
pleading, motion or other
paper [and] that to the best
of the signer's knowledge,
information, and belief
formed after reasonable in-
quiry it is well grounded in
fact and is warranted by
existing law or a good faith
argument for the exten-
sion, modification, or re-
versal of existing law, and
that it is not interposed for
any improper purpose...
If a... paper is signed in
violation of this rule, the
court, upon motion or upon
its own initiative, shall im-
pose upon the person who
signed it, a represented
party, or both, an appro-
priate sanction, which may
include an order to pay to
the other party or parties
the amount of the reasona-
ble expenses incurred be-
cause of the filing of the pa-






Rule 11 recognizes that there
must be an end to litigation over
an issue.
By the same token, the draf-
ters of the rule stated that they
did not want its benefits to be
"offset by the cost of satellite lit-
igation over the imposition of
sanctions." This worthy goal has
not always been achieved. Law-
yers have tended to move for
sanctions much more frequently
than is justified or desirable. And
courts have not always acted
firmly to control litigation over
sanctions.
The profusion of activity un-
der Rule 11 is a genuine problem
that must be addressed. Lawyers
must recognize that Rule I 1 is not
a fee-shifting rule-it does not
entitle one side to recover fees
from the other simply because it
has prevailed. Sanctions under
Rule I1 are appropriate only in
cases of abuse and those, fortu-
nately, are not common. The an-
swer to this problem, however, is
not to eliminate Rule 11 but to
improve its administration.
Who Should Be Sanctioned?
The rule permits a court to im-
pose sanctions either on the law-
yer who signed the offending
paper or on the party the lawyer
represents; problems can arise in
deciding who should be sanc-
tioned. The court may have to de-
termine who is responsible. In
most cases, this determination
can be avoided since the lawyer
who signed the paper is pres-
umptively responsible. Of course,
if the lawyer then proceeds to try
to blame the client, serious dif-
ficulties follow. The lawyer be-
comes disqualified and the
attorney-client privilege is in
jeopardy. Fortunately, this is a
situation that rarely arises and,
with proper judicial manage-
ment, should be avoidable. But
again, the proper approach is to
address the specific problem, not
to condemn the rule.
On balance, Rule 11 is useful
and necessary. To be effective, it
must be carefully administered.
Both lawyers and judges must
recognize that it addresses the
exceptional, not the routine case.
Perhaps experience under it will
suggest some revisions. Repeal of
the rule, however, would send the
wrong message. EL
CON
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on the merits. Cases survive mo-
tions to dismiss, motions for
summary judgment, and motions
for directed verdicts. The trial
court permits the case to go to
jury. When the jury returns the
verdict in favor of one litigant,
the thrill of victory for the
triumphant party is often fol-
lowed with a Rule 11 motion to
make sure that the final arrow
pierces the heart of the van-
quished party and their counsel.
All too often sanctions are
granted in these situations. It is
hard for me to believe that
"hindsight" is not involved when
sanctions are imposed after a
party has jumped all the hurdles
(motions to dismiss, motions for
stimmary judgment, and motions
for directed verdict), but none-
theless loses the ultimate race.
Finally, the Advisory Commit-
tee Comments state that Rule 11
"does not require a party or an
attorney to disclose privileged
communication or work prod-
tict" in order to defend against a
Rule 11 motion. Although the
courts have paid precious little
attention to this issue, disclosure
of privileged information and
work product has proven to be a
vexing problem.
Both court opinions and com-
mentators have stated that the
privilege and work-product doc-
trine need not be invaded in or-
der to defend against a Rule 11
motion. In fact, a lawyer is placed
in a terrible dilemma when a Rule
11 motion is filed jointly against
the lawyer and his or her client.
Terrible Dilemma
Number one, when a lawyer
and client are faced with a joint
motion for sanctions, a conflict of
interest may arise that requires
the client to retain separate
counsel (hardly a cost-saving de-
vice).
Number two, commentators
have suggested that when you
are retained by a client you
should make a "Miranda-type"
Rule 11 warning stating that
privileged information may be
divulged if a Rule 11 motion is
filed. Such a warning is not cal-
culated to foster the communi-
cation between client and counsel
that the privilege was developed
to protect.
A lawyer owes his or her pri-
mary duty to the client. The mere
fact that a lawyer must defend
against a Rule 11 motion should
not mean that a lawyer is per-
mitted to divulge privileged in-
formation, even though his or her
reputation may be at stake. After
all, the opposing party has
launched the charge against both
the lawyer and the client. The
lawyer's highest duty of loyalty
to his or her client remains fully
intact.
The lawyer may have care-
fully and reasonably investi-
gated pertinent facts and
researched all of the applicable
law. Nonetheless, the client may
have advertently or inadver-
tently misled the lawyer. I sub-
mit that under the applicable
canons of ethics, the lawyer in a
Rule 11 sanction proceeding must
protect the privilege at all costs-
even to the cost of the lawyer's
reputation, pocketbook, or even
his or her license to practice be-
fore the federal court.
The foregoing represents just
some of the general mischief cre-
ated by Rule 11. We operated un-
der the 1938 Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure fairly well for
nearly five decades. In 1983, the
drafters of Rule 11 decided that
"abusive" litigation had to be
curtailed. Their solution was to
amend Rule 11. As noted above,
rather than curtailing the filing
of lawsuits, Rule 11 has spawned
a tremendous amount of collat-
eral sanctions litigation, which
Spring 1990
has added to the already large
caseload of district and appellate
judges,
Without saying so, Rule 11 has
repealed the philosophy of lib-
eral rules of pleading and discov-
ery that were explicit and
inherent when the Federal Rules
were adopted in 1938. Now a
lawyer would be a fool not to
plead evidence. Further, Rule 11
decisions are quite clear that lib-
eral rules of discovery cannot be
used to escape the lash of Rule 11
sanctions.
No Predictability
The most telling condemnation
of Rule 11 is that it carries with
it no certainty because sanctions
are imposed inconsistently and
with utter unpredictability.
A major factor leading to this
unpredictability has been the
failure of courts to agree that
there is a single purpose for the
rule. Three purposes have been
espoused: punishment, deter-
rence, and compensation. The
failure to agree on the true pur-
pose leads to a tremendous vari-
ation in results, including both
the decision as to whether the
rule has been violated itself and
the type of sanctions to be im-
posed.
There is at least some hope that
the confusion as to the purpose
of Rule 1 1 will be eliminated by
the Supreme Court's decision in
Pavelic & LeFlore v. Marvel En-
tertainment Group, 110 S. Ct. 456
(1989). In Pavelic, the court held
that Rule 11 sanctions could be
iml)osed only on the signing at-
torney, and not on the attorney's
firm. The court stated that the
purpose of the rule is not com-
pensation: "The purpose of the
provision in question, however,
is not reimbursement but 'sanc-
tion.' " Pavelic therefore estab-
lished that punishment, and the
accompanying "economic deter-
rence upon the signing attor-
ney," is the primary purpose of
Rule 11.
It would be naive to think,
however, that Pavelic will slid-
denly eliminate the mischief
wrought by the tension between
the goals of punishment and
compensation. It is apparent that
many courts still view compen-
sation as the primary purpose of
the rule. These courts seem to fa-
vor the English system wherc the
losing side pays the opponent's
attorney's fees. Payment of the
opposing side's attorney's fees
remains by far the most frequent
"punishment" imposed tinder
Rule 11. Yet the problem will per-
sist as long as the "punishment"
dished out remains "compensa-
tion" of the opposing side. This
is obviously contrary to the
American rule and contrary to
our tradition of free access to the
courts.
Moreover, the studies of Rule
11 demonstrate that the sting of
the rule is most often directed to-
ward Title VII and civil rights
plaintiffs. The law is intended to
encourage the vindication of the
public policies behind these stat-
utes, but individual Title VII and
civil-rights plaintiffs and their
counsel can hardly afford to pay
the large sanctions that have
been imposed in these cases.
Thus, Rule 11 has certainly
chilled the very type of litigation
that our society wishes to en-
courage.
As noted above, Rule 11 also
chills a great deal of advocacy di-
rected toward expansion of the
law's horizons. Although the
Second Circuit in Eastway Con-
struction Corp., 762 F.2d 243
(1985), stated that advances in
the law almost always are
greeted by initial failure, the Sec-
ond Circuit also held that a law-
yer could be sanctioned for
arguing against settled prece-
dent. flow is a lawyer to know
when Rule 11 permits an argu-
ment for the modification or re-
versal of law or whether such an
argument will meet with.Rule 11
sanctions? The answer cannot be
found in the rule itself, tile Com-
mittee Comments, or the appli-
cable appellate court decisions.
One of the primary goals of the
ABA and its Litigation Section is
to enhance civility among law-
yers. The filing of Rule 11 mo-
tions and the inevitable Rule 11
letter wars, which have become
commonplace in metropolitan
areas, have had the opposite ef-
fect. It is difficult to remain civil
to your opponent when he or she
seeks large monetary sanctions
against you or your client.
Rule 11 is also misdesigned be-
cause it robs the trial court of all
discretion. The rule speaks in
mandatory terms. Thus, the trial
court must order sanctions if the
rule is violated. At the very least,
the rule should be changed to
state the trial judge "may" im-
pose sanctions, rather than man-
date that the trial judge "must"
impose sanctions.
The Matter of Reputation
Of course, being sanctioned
places a great stigma on a law-
yet. Thus, even though the sanc-
tion is in a paltry amount, counsel
must appeal the decision to pro-
tect his or her reputation. In ad-
dition to the concern about
reputation, sanctions are often
followed by disciplinary pro-
ceedings either by the federal
court or the state disciplinary
system. Accordingly, merely
paying the amount of the sanc-
tion does not solve the lawyer's
problem. Further complicating
the issue is the definition by the
Seventh Circuit that a violation
of Rule 11 is the equivalent of
''malpractice." This ruling has
grave imnlications regarding a
lawyer's malpractice insurance.
If all of the foregoing were not
sufficient, one should also bear
in mind that litigants and their
counsel obtain precious little due
process in the sanctions proceed-
ing. Courts frequently hand out
sanctions in large amounts with-
out affording any discovery or an
evidentiary hearing. A litigant
with the smallest claim gets more
due process than is normally af-
forded in a Rule 11 proceeding.
The problem is also magnified by
the fact that many appellate
courts grant sanctions following
an unsuccessful appeal.
The courts operated quite well
before the birth of Rule 11. We
do not need Rule 11 to counter lit-
igation abuse. The courts have
available Section 1927. The
courts also have inherent power
to punish improper conduct.
The profession would do well
to effect the repeal of Rule 11 as
rapidly as possible. CL
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